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CRIMINAL LAW- THE FELONY MURDER DOCTRINE AS RELATED TO DRUNKENNESS
In the early days of English common law no concessions were
made because of the intoxication of the accused m criminal cases.
A decision reported as early as 1551 indicates that the death penalty
would be meted out to the defendant although he was extremely
drunk, the court saying:
if a person that is drunk kills another, this
"
shall be a felony and he shall be hanged for it, and
yet he did it through ignorance, for when he was
drunk he had no understanding nor memory- but inasmuch as that ignorance was occasioned by his own act
and folly and he .might have avoided it, he shall not
be privileged thereby" 1
An even more severe attitude toward drunkenness was taken by
Hale and Blackstone,' who considered drunkenness as an aggravation of the crime committed. Probably the principal reason for
refusing to give much consideration to the effect of intoxication on
crimes of homicide was the belief as expressed by Wharton that
"There could rarely be a conviction for homicide if drunkenness
avoided responsibility."' It might be said then that drunkenness as
dealt with in these cases was held to have no mitigating effect on
homicide in the early period of our law. It was sufficient for conviction to show that a man had been killed by the defendant without
any extenuating circumstances.
The extreme rigor of this rule was relaxed in the nineteenth
century in the case of Regina v. Doherty in which Judge Stephen
declared: "
although you cannot take drunkenness as any excuse
for a crime, yet when the crime is such that the intention of the party
committing it is one of its constituent elements, you may look at the
fact that a man was in drink in considering whether he formed the
intention necessary to constitute the crime." ' From this statement it
is seen that at this stage of the law, intoxication of the accused -was
neither a defense nor an excuse for a crime, but that it might be considered to prevent the prosecution from making out the crime where
specific intent was a szne qua non of the offense.
In discussing this problem it is well to state the definition of
murder. Stephen in his Digest of the Crzminal Law defined murder
'Reniger v Fogossa, 1 Plowden 1, 75 Eng. Rep. 1, 31 (1551).

1 HALE, HISTORY OF PLEAS OF THE CROWN (new ed. 1736)
34 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES (Sharswood ed. 1871) 25.
'1 WHARTON, CRIVINAL LAW (12th ed. 1932) 95.
216 Cox C. C. 306, 308 (1887).
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as an unlawful homicide committed with malice aforethought, and
divided the situations constituting malice into four categories:
(A)
(B)
(C)
(D)

intentional killing;
knowledge that the act causing death would
probably cause death or grievous bodily harm;
an intent to commit any felony;
homicide committed while resisting arrest?

It is the purpose of this paper to consider drunkenness as related to
the third category, commonly known as the felony murder rule.
By Foster's time any homicide committed in the perpetration of
any felony was held to be murder as a matter of law. This view is
understandable, however, when the attitude which the law took
toward felonies at that time is known. Felonies were treated as offenses punishable by death! Too, all these common law crimes involved a certain degree of physical violence and danger to life? But
with the simultaneous growth of humanistic philosophy and statutory non-dangerous felonies the harshness of the rule soon became
evident and resulted in the decision rendered by Stephen m the
famous case of Regina v. Serne.' There the celebrated jurist said:
"I think that, instead of saying that any act done with intent to commit a felony and which causes death is murder, it would be reasonable to say that any act known to be dangerous to life, and likely in
amounts to murder."
itself to cause death
With this decision a radical change took place in the law's attitude toward homicide committed in the course of a felony. No longer
could a man be convicted of murder by the mere showing of a
homicide-felony combination. It appears that Stephen, in Regina v.
Serne, added a subjective requirement, namely, that the actor must
have knowledge of the danger attendant upon the act." In the English
courts the emphasis was shifted from the felony itself to the act
which accompanied it and which produced death. This seemingly
tolled the bell which announced the death of the felony murder rule,
since the requirements were substantially the same as set out in "B"
of Stephen's analysis of murder."
7

STEPHEN, DIGEST OF CRIm. LAW

(7th ed. 1926) 161.

FoSTER, CRowN LAW (2nd ed. 1791) 139.
Op. cit. supra note 4, at 686.
'The common law felonies were arson, robbery, burglary, larceny, rape, sodomy and mayhem.
" 16 Cox C. C. 311 (1877).
nId. at 313.
2 See Turner, The Mental Element in Crimes at Common Law
(1938) 6 CAMB. L. J. 31, 58; Hall Intoxication and Criminal Responsibility (1944) 57 HARV. L. R. 1045, 1069; cf. Tincher, The Negligent
Murder (1939) 28 Ky. L. J. 53, 56 n. 21, Sparks, Should The Objective Test Be Applied In Negligent Murder Cases? (1947) 35 KY.
L. J."This required that knowledge of the dangerousness of the act
be present.
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Prior to this decision, a drunken person could be convicted under
the felony murder rule by proving that he killed in furtherance of a
felony. Under the version enunciated in Regina v. Serne the defendant could not be adjudged guilty of murder even though he intended
to commit the felony, unless he had knowledge of the danger.
For example, assume that John Jones becomes intoxicated, and
suddenly realizing that he must replenish his empty purse, decides
to commit a robbery. He sees a lady walking down a dark street at
night and resolves to seize her purse. He certainly has the intent to
carry into execution the felony of robbery. Assume also that the
lady is easily frightened and afflicted with a serious heart ailment.
Jones accosts her with the single purpose of seizing her purse, but
because of the extreme fright which enthralls her, and the struggle
which ensues, she suffers a heart attack and dies. Under the rule
enunciated in the Serne case it is probably illogical to hold the defendant for murder. Here the State has the additional burden of
proving that the accused knew that the act he committed was one
involving a substantial risk to human life. Jones was aware of the
fact that he was committing a robbery, but he may not have drawn
the conclusion that the acts constituted a great danger.
Some fifty years subsequent to the Serne case, appeared a decision which erased Stephen's qualification of the felony murder
rule and made it again completely objective. This was the case of
14
Director of Public Prosecutions v. Beard. The defendant was indicted for the murder of a thirteen year old girl. While intoxicated,
and in furtherance of rape, he placed his hand over the victim's
mouth and throat in order to subdue her and as a result she died of
suffocation. In holding the accused guilty of murder Lord Birkenin Beard's case it was only necessary to prove that
head stated: "
the violent act causing death was done in the furtherance of the
1
drunkenness
felony of rape."' Further in his decision he said: "
in this case could be no defense unless it could be established that he
was incapable of forming the intent to commit it (rape) which was
not in fact, and manifestly, having regard for the evidence, could
not be contended."
Completely ignored in the decision was the importance of knowledge of the dangerous character of the act accompanying the felony.
An external standard was created, composed of a violent felony
and an additional factor, a violent act. Let the factors prescribed by
this case be present and the accused would necessarily be guilty of
7
murder. Even the view of Holmes, that a dangerous act causing
death of a human being was murder if the actor had knowledge of
circumstances that would have led a man of common understanding
14

(1920) App. Cases 479.

1Id. at 504.
at 504
1'Id.
7HOLMES,

THE COMMON

LAW (1881) 55-56.
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to foresee death as a result of the act seems to be rather harsh. Here
however, the House of Lords apparently decided that knowledge of
such circumstances was superfluous.
That tins is the law in England today is evidenced by the case
of Rex. v. Betts and Ridley " decided in 1930, wherein the court held
that if the defendant caused death by a violent act done m the course
of a felony of violence, he was guilty of murder. The court declared
that the accused had received the benefit of the doubt when the trial
judge had issued an instruction based on a view similar to that of
Holmes.'
Cases in the United States tend to adhere to a view bearing
more resemblance to the doctrine set out in the Beard case than to
the one held in the Serne case.' Very little importance is given to
the subjective element, while attention is focused on the felony. The
only distinction relied on in the American courts is the dangerousness of the felony, some states applying the felony murder rule in
cases in which a combination of a homicide and any felony exists,'
while others restrict it to homicide accompanied by a dangerous
felony.' Typical among the arguments employed in cases within
both categories is the statement that the felony dispenses with any
V
proof of an intent to kill.
' Certainly this intent is not necessary in
order to obtain a murder conviction, but it is believed that an application of "B" of Stephen's analysis would bring about a more just
result in felony homicides. This procedure would be much more
logical than to inflict the death penalty on a man because he has
committed a felony-either dangerous or non-dangerous-accompanied by an "accidental and unintended"' homicide.
It is submitted that the doctrine enunciated in the Serne case
reaches the correct result. In order to satisfy the requirements of
malice aforethought it should be shown 'that the accused foresaw the
possible consequences of his act and that he was aware of the risk
to human life. The felony murder rule should be discarded regardless of whether drunkenness or soberness characterized the defendant. A murder conviction should not be rendered if the accused was
so intoxicated at the time of committing the death-dealing act that
he did not realize the danger to life it involved and consequently did
not foresee the death which occurred. If this foresight cannot be
"144 Law Times 526 (1930)
"Id. at 528.
'People v Kaye, 43 Cal. App. 802, 111 P 2d 679, 687 (1941)
Simpson v. Commonwealth, 293 Ky. 831, 832, 170 S.W 2d 869 (1943)
'People v De La Roi, 36 Cal. App. 287, 97 P 2d 836 (1939).
'Washington v. State, 181 Ark. 1011, 28 S.W 2d 1055 (1930)
State v. Schnelt, 341 Mo. 241, 108 S.W 2d 377 (1937)
'People v. Kaye, 43 Cal. App. 802, 111 P 2d 679, 687 (1941)
"People v. Valentine, -Cal.169 P 2d 1, 10 (1946), citing
People v. Lindley 26 Cal. 2d 780, 791, 161 P 2d 227, 233 (1945).
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proved, the conviction should be one of manslaughter for an unlawful
homicide committed as the result of a reckless act. This is a sufficient deterrent and does not produce the harsh consequence of labeling one a murder who may be a useful member of society.
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